A DAM NUISANCE!

 

Previously I introduced the Nile river and its importance and fragility, considering the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance dam (GERD). In this blog, I will explore the projected negative consequences of the GERD on food production on lower riparians.

“The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics,” - Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Half a billion people experience severe water scarcity all year round, of those 27million, are in Egypt (Mekonnen & Hoekstra 2016). Achieving a water and food balance in a transboundary river basin is extremely challenging as different riparians have different motivations for how they want to use the water resources and have different ideas of their rights over the water. This is especially true for the Nile basin. It is believed the “wars of the next century will be over water”, Ismail Serageldin, then World Bank Vice President, so much so that 7 years prior, Boutros Boutrous-Ghali, then Egypt’s minister of state for foreign affairs argued that “the next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics,”.

INTRODUCING THE GERD

The GERD is projected to have major impacts on Egypt’s food security during the filling process, particularly if this process ensues during a dry period, as a filling procedure is yet to be agreed. To fill the dam, downstream water needs to be partially halted. Food production from irrigated agriculture is projected to decrease by 9-19%, during the reservoir filling process, and approximately 4%, during the GERD’s operation, compared to now (Elsayed et al 2020). The largest threat to Egypt is the prolonged drying of arable land leading to desertification of 2-4million hectares of the current 8-10million hectares of arable land, significantly diminishing Egypt’s ability to cultivate the land for food crops. Complications for Sudan and Egypt’s water flow from evaporative losses are exacerbated by climate change, also reducing the streamflow to Lake Nasser, Aswan, Egypt in the first 5 years (Zhang  et al 2015).

Source: Terra Matter (2020, Jan 17) 'Why Egypt's Lifeline is Drying Up' 

Variability and uncertainty of the reservoir filling policy by Ethiopia leaves water-dependent sectors vulnerable including municipal use, agriculture, and drinking, not even mentioning the economic repercussions of such ambiguity (King & Block 2012). Egypt is a principal exporter of corn, fava beans, rice and wheat, making agriculture a majorly important sector, contributing to roughly one-eighth of the country’s GDP and employing one-quarter of the labour force, facilitating a strong foreign exchange for Egypt. The Egyptian and Sudanese economy could have major implications whereby the reduction in arable land diminishes harvest yields, increasing food commodity prices, resulting in weakened food insecurity. Although this is contingent on the level of water withdrawal in Sudan (Kahsay et al 2015), the future operation of these sectors remains inherently uncertain until there is an agreed-upon reservoir retention policy put in place between the three nations. With heightened tensions between downstream riparians, it is uncertain how the use of the Nile will change. As mentioned previously, when exploring the effects of dams on water and food in Africa, it is essential to also explore the politics of riparians in a transboundary basin, as this will have large effects on how the water is shared and used, affecting food production. I guess I am critiquing Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his claim that the Nile waters are not inherently political. The Nile is fraught in the politics of supplying water reliably to 11 water-stressed countries with a combined population of 487.3million.

The GERD ends Egypt’s millennia-long monopoly over the Nile (Gebreluel 2014). The source of tension is due to Egypt and Sudan being highly dependent on the flows originating in Ethiopia. The major concern is the effects on the availability of water resources, further reinforced by the uncertainty over the impacts of the GERD as policies of reservoir retention are undecided despite construction being underway. Disputes over the management of the Nile precede, but are exacerbated by, the construction of the GERD. Egypt was given monopoly by the British before the Nile Basin Initiative was signed in 1999 to increase cooperation, before it was formalised by the Cooperative Framework Agreement (Swain 2002; Ibrahim 2010). However, this was signed only by upstream riparians. The continuous back-and-forth indicates the complexity of transboundary basin management.

So, what does this have to do with food? Exploring the politics of this contentious transboundary water resource is crucial for comprehending the implications of the GERD on water supply and thus food production for downstream riparians.

The question is...

Is the GERD that bad?